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Some Current
Thoughts On
Treaty-Based
Federalism

By Eric Stein
Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law,
The University of Michigan

This essay is based on a paper prepared for the occasion of
Prof. Covey T. Oliver's retirement from a distinguished
teaching career in international law at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School. A somewhat different version
will appear in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
In a series of lectures delivered in 1974, Professor Oliver
raised some fundamental questions on modern federalism :
is federalism "declining," is there such a thing as a treatyhased .federation, and is it legitimate to classify the
European Economic Community as "an incipient," or
"semi-" or, perhaps, "meta-federal structure for
governance"? 1 These questions were asked-and
answered - more than five years ago, a suhstantial segment
of time in our era of change. Have Oliver's answers stood
the test of time?
Is Federalism Declining?
Out of some 140 (now some 160) entities recognized as
states, Oliver observed that not more than a dozen are
federal in form. "No independent observer has been found
who would classify the Soviet Union as a functioning
federalism," and there is "substantial doubt" on thi8 score
concerning the Federal Republic of Brazil and other
socialist and non-socialist federations which are also
essentially "de facto uni~ary states." The list of formally
federal states that do have realistic claims to being
functioning federal structures is thus reduced to a handful:
Australia, Austria, Canada, the Federal Republic of
Germany, India, Malaysia, Switzerland, and the United
States. Oliver suggests, however, two additional
dimensions:
"(i) the partial federation known as the European
Communities and (ii) the possibilities for federalism as
the road to regionalism elsewhere . ... "
While federalism "may not be growing-indeed may be
declining-in national State systems, it is growing and
prohably will continue to grow in regional systems and thus
to be a major means for evolution beyond the present
structure of the world community."
Today, the diagnosis of the state of federalism must be, if
anything, even more tentative. Admittedly, the trend
toward increased centralization has continued in the
Federal Republic of Germany and, it has been generally
assumed, in the United States as well. Yet the federal
revenue-sharing legislation has increased the financial
clout of the states, and the current political rhetoric
directed against the remote central government and its
hureaucracy has brought about some loosening of federal
controls over regulated industries. There has also been a
certain resurgence of regional feelings and solidarity and
some support for allowing the states a greater margin of
freedom in matters of strong local or regional interest. In
24

1976, for the first time since the early New Deal era, the

Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the
application of a regulatory act of Congress to state
government activities as an unconstitutional intrusion on
state sovereignty {National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) ). hut it would he most improvident to view
this five-to-four decision as a swallow heralding a new
summer for judicial federalism in this country. In fact,
persistent demands for additional health, education, and
welfare services. consumer and environmental protection,
and for industrial suhsidies have worked for still further
centralization and more bureaucracy. Apart from the
exasperation with the overgrown central bureaucracy, the
primary issue of the day in the perennial tension situation
huilt into the American federal system has been the power
contest between the federal Congress and the post-imperial
Presidency. rather than a question of federal against state
power. The overbureaucratization, we may note in passing,
is perhaps accentuated by, but is certainly not confined to,
federal structures. In the neighboring Canadian federation,
putting aside the worst-case scenario of disintegration, the
trend surely does not point away from some form of
federalism if the country is to remain a viable nation-state.
In Europe, remarkabl~ mutations are taking place in
some of the archetype unitary states which may harbor
seeds of federal patterns. In Italy. the "regions" which until
recently were little more than a constitutional mirage have
now been given a firm statutory basis, and regional
assemblies were selected whose legislation is subject to
review by a central judiciary. Belgium is galloping toward a
federal framework apparently as the only system capable
of containing the linguistic controversy. In France, the
Napoleonic centralism is subject to considerable stress by
regional interests ranging from Brittany to Corsica and by a
growing demand for increased local participation in
governance- a trend manifested not only in politics but also
in economic life and in education. Evidence of similar
pressures has appeared in the new Spain as well. However,
perhaps the most unexpected developments have occurred
in the United Kingdom where the Dicey-fostered (if not
manufactured) myth of "parliamentary sovereignty" has
been under some stress in the face of new realities. No
lesser authority than Lord (then Lord Justice) Scarman has
raised the need for a "new constitutional settlement" that
would assure in Britain the continued observance and
normative superiority of the European Community legal
order and also the enforcement of the European Bill of
Rights, accepted by the United Kingdom in the European
Convention on Human Rights with its transnational
institutions, the Commission and the Court of Human
Rights. Last but not least, the "devolution" of power from
Westminster to Scotland remains a distinct possibility even
after the failure of the recent referendum; if put into effect
in one form or another, it may mark the end of the classic
United Kingdom structure and require an umpiring
function between the central and regional authorities. Lord
Scarman's solution would include "entrenched provisions
(including a Bill of Rights)" and a "Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom charged with the duty of protecting the
Constitution."2
If federalism in mature federations reveals a continuing
accretion of central regulatory authority, it is in a sense
paradoxical to see in the United Kingdom as well as in
Belgium and Italy a reallocation of power from national
governments to subnational regions. The just-mentioned
European transnational arrangements, the European
Community, and the European Human Rights Convention,
also reduce or restrain national power, in favor, however,
of the new transnational institutions. Clearly, complex and
often conflicting forces are at work here. It should become
clearer by the end of this century whether, in this tri-level
perspective. the traditional "sovereign" nation-state system

will be replaced in Europe by a structure of a still
undetermined shape, marked by a heavier reliance on the
ethnically. linguistically, or economically based regions on
one hand and the transnational institutions on the other.

Treaty-based Federalism
Another fistful of nettles grasped by Oliver is the
question of whether there is such a thing as a treaty-based
federalism. For whatever it may be worth, one may recall
the argument that, concurrent with the separation from
Great Britain, the thirteen states in North America were "in
a state of Nature toward each other" and the union was
formed by a "compact" among them rather than by a
constitution written by the "people." The Supreme Court
rejected the "compact" doctrine in McCulloch v. Maryland
(17 U.S . (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ). and later again in the
context of Justice Sutherland's fanciful theory of external
sovereignty {United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304 {1936) ). One may speculate, however, whether
the course of federalism in the United States would have
been significantly different (all other factors remaining
equal) if the "compact" view of the formation of the Union
had been generally accepted.
A more fruitful line of inquiry is the problem of whether
the European Community, which is exclusively treatybased. may be legitimately viewed as an incipient federal
structure . Although the final returns obviously are not in as
yet , it is probably safe to say, at the risk of ruffling some
positivist-formalist feathers, that from a strictly normative
viewpoint it has made little difference that the Community
was established by a network of treaties rather than by a
formal constitution. This is due primarily to the impact of
the Court of Justice whose case law was adumbrated by
Oliver and bropght up to date most recently by Professors
Casper, Bridge, and Riesenfeld.J
From its inception. the Court of Justice has construed the
European Economic Community Treaty in a constitutional
mode rather than employing the traditional international
law methodology of treaty interpretation. The treaty, the
Court held, is more than an ordinary international
agreement creating mutual obligations between states
parties: it created "a new legal order" in which members
have limited their sovereignty, and it conferred rights and
imposed obligations, not only on the member states but also
directly on nationals of the member states which national
courts must enforce. The treaty itself mandates that
Community "regulations," a form of legislation enacted by
Community institutions, are "directly applicable" law in
national courts and administrative agencies. The Court has,
however, progressively expanded the concept of directly
applicable Community law to comprise all provisions in the
constitutive treaty itself and all Community acts that do not
require further implementation by either the national or
the Community institutions and thus are capable of being
given direct effect. As a consequence, the question of
whether an individual party is able to enforce a right
derived from a given Community law provision has turned
increasingly on issues such as the purpose of the provision
(whether it purported to create a "private cause of action"
in addition to its regulatory purpose). on standing to sue
before the Court of Justice itself, or on the selection of a
proper remedy before national tribunals which under the
treaty must certify questions of Community law to the
Court of Justice for a "preliminary ruling." The way the
Court of Justice has defined the scope and, as we shall see
below, the effect of a "directly applicable" provision has
little similarity to Chief Justice Marshall's definition of a
"self-executing" treaty provision {Foster and Elam v.
Neilson, (2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829) ).
In a companion line of cases, reflecting at times a spirited
dialogue with the highest national tribunals, especially the
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Italian Constitutional Court, the Court of Justice established
the rule that in the event of a conflict between Community
law and national law, national courts must apply
Community law over prior, subsequent, and even
constitutional national law. In the latest of this group of
cases. the Court held in 1978 that an Italian judge must
disregard national law conflicting with Community law as
soon as it is faced with the conflict in a case before it and
may not wait for an adjudication by the Constitutional
Court as would have been required by the Italian
procedure [Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stain v. Simmenthal S.p.A .. Monza, f1978J E.C.R. 629) .
Commenting on this latest exuberant decision, two British
constitutional experts considered it logical. while two
others exclaimed: "This may be good Community Law, but I
submit that it is not good British Constitutional Law," and
"This is exactlv what our fundamental constitutional rule
forbids . " 4
•
The European Economic Community Treaty contains no
supremacy clause but the Court of Justice discovered one in
the interstices of the new legal order. Moreover, the Court
turned its relatively slim jurisdictional base into a
procedure approximating appellate review of national law
for conformity with Community law. The result is
reminiscent of John Marshall's combined creations in
Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. Maryland, and Gibbons
v. Ogden [1Cranch137 [1803). 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
22 U.S. 9 (Wheat.] 1 (1824)) .
In a third line of cases of a significant constitutional
import. the Court dealt with the Community's status in
international law. International law, the Court held, is
supreme in the Community, and therefore a national court
must apply a "directly applicable" provision of a treaty
between the Community and a third state even if it should
conflict with Community law (Joint Cases 21-24/72,
International Fruit Co .. NV v. Produktshap voor Groenten
en Fruit. [19721E.C.R.1219). Relying again not just on the
text of the treaty, but on its esprit and economie, the Court
refused to limit the Community's power to enter into
international agreements with third states to instances
expressly authorized in the treaty and proceeded to define
the Community's treaty-making power as paralleling in
subject matter its internal law- and policy-making
competence [Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, (1971]
E.C.R. 263) . This definition, although aptly termed as "the
exact reverse of Missouri v. Holland," has had a similar
effect of extending the central treaty-making power, and it
has been broadened still somewhat further in cases handed
down more recently [see e .g. Cases 3/76, 4/76, 6/76, In re
Kramer, [19761E.C.R. 1279).
The extent to which judicial authorities in the member
states have accepted the Court's rulings is nothing short of
remarkable, all the more so since the opinions called for
important adjustments in national constitutional practice,
including the introduction of judicial review of national
legislation in those member states where it was unknown.
The exceptions to the general acceptance have until most
recently proved less serious than one might have
anticipated. In the Internazionale Handelsgesellschaft case
the German Federal Constitutional Court did not reject the
principle of Community law supremacy, nor did it
invalidate a Community act that the Court of Justice earlier
upheld . The Constitutional Court indicated, however, with
three justices dissenting, that "in an exceptional case" it
may refuse enforcement of a Community act if it finds that
such an act deprives an individual citizen of one of his
fundamental rights enumerated in the German Basic Law
[Constitution) . This position, echoed also by the Italian
Constitutional Court, is justified, the German Court
explained, "by the present status of integration within the
Community." At this stage, the majority opined, the
Community lacks appropriate institutions for resolving a
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conflict of this nature : The law-making is in the hands of the
executive [the Council of Ministers with the Executive
Commission) rather than a democratically elected
Parliament, and no "codified catalogue of basic rights"
exists in the Community law.s
Responding, as it we;e, to this reservation of national
judicial power, the Court of Justice reaffirmed the rule of
an unqualified supremacy of Community law, but it
indicated that it will itself protect basic individual rights as
a "part of the general principles of law," taking account of
"common constitutional traditions of the Member States"
and "international agreements for the protection of human
rights in which Member States participate .. . ."[Case 4/73,
Nold v. Commission of the European Communities, f19741
E.C.R. 491) . In a later case the Court of Justice referred to
the European Human Rights Convention to which all nine
member states are parties as an appropriate source,
suggesting a link between the two, thus far separate, aspects
of the emerging European constitutional system (Case
36/75, Ru ti Ii v. Minister of Interior, [1975] E.C.R. 1219). The
heightened concern for basic human rights has stimulated a
debate on the means that the Community should employ for
a more effective protection of these rights: Should the
Community legislator enact a Bill of Rights? Should it be
left to the Court of Justice to develop such a bill
progressively on a case-by-case basis? Or should the
Community as a "person" in international law become, or
be considered, a party to the European Convention on
Human Rights? The last alternative appears to be under
consideration.
The venerable and haughty French Conseil d'Etat, which
in an early notorious case refused to certify a genuine
question of Community law to the Court of Justice, has
subsequently followed the proper procedure, as did the
courts in the other member states. However, in a 1978
decision, the Conseil refused to give direct effect in French
law to a Community act (a "directive"] which the Court of
Justice held to be self-executing despite the fact, relied
upon by the Conseil, that according to the letter of the
Treaty any "directive" required implementation by
national institutions [No. 11604, Minister of Interior v.
Cohn-Bendit, Dec. 22, 1978) . The Conseil's decision
rendered in what was essentially a moot case constitutes
the first act of open defiance of the Community Court's
authority as an umpire between Community and national
power and a rejection of the Court's basic approach to the
constitutive treaty. The Conseil d'Etat has added its voice to
the still sporadic but strident criticism of the Court in
certain French political and journalistic quarters, not
unrelated to the electoral campaign for the European
Parliament. There is no indication thus far that the
Community Commission will want to stage a confrontation
with the French government by making use of its authority
to hold France responsible before the Court of Justice for
violating Community law.
This brief glance at the Community's living law readily
reveals-behind the veil of the indigenous nomenclature
and jargon- distinct federalist elements that meet the
criteria suggested by Oliver for the phenomenon of treatybased federalism. An inquiry into treaty-based
transnational structures outside Europe, in Latin America
and Africa, is beyond the confines of this gloss. Suffice it to
say. however, that none of these structures possesses a
judicial tribunal organized and functioning in a way
comparable to the Court of Justice. It is appropriate at this
point to cite Oliver's own conclusion:
Further reflection shows that the strongest parallel
between successful national federations and the
European "transnational" one is that in all of them
judicial resolutions of issues of federalism by the highest
judicial organ of the federation are accepted without

resistance hy the constituent State judicial organs. In a
very real sense, the unifying force is respect for the "rule
of law"-not merely in the conventional "inter-national"
sense of adherence to pacta sunt servanda as a basic
principle of the international law of treaties- but of
something more: sense of sharing of normative hierarchy
and of professional conditioning to work in an organic
corpus juris. One might say of the partial federation of
Europe: it exists and it functions because all the
European judges involved live and work on that
assumption and the politicians do not intervene against
what the judges do.
The Caveats
This sunny view of the judicial role in building the
European Economic Community and, more generally, any
positive appraisal of the Community as an incipient federal
structure calls for a series of caveats.
First. the federal-type pattern functions only in areas of
the customs union, free movement of factors of production,
agriculture, certain aspects of social and regional policies,
competition, harmonization of legislation and technical
standards. and foreign commercial policy. In these areas
the Community competence is delineated in the treaty in
more or less express terms. Beyond this, the Community
organs were a hie, within limits and subject to some
criticism particularly in Great Britain, to invoke the
"implied powers" in Article 235 as a legal basis for
expanding their legislative competence to new fields not
mentioned in the treaty, such as environment and consumer
protection. However, the federal-type pattern has not
extended to the important "second generation" problems,
such as the projected economic and monetary union,
common energy, industrial, research and development, and
general regional policies. These are subject to a process of
difficult and protracted intergovernmental negotiations
with limited results thus far. These negotiations will not
hecome any easier with the planned accession of Greece,
Spain, and Portugal. The recent decision to launch a new
"European Monetary System" backed up by a $33-billion
credit fund may prove a milestone on the road toward a
common European currency, if the governments in fact take
the progressive steps. Although the national governments
are no longer able to use a variety of traditional instruments
of national economic policy, they have been unwilling-due
to domestic pressures-to transfer the additional economic
and monetary policy powers to the Community and help
create the necessary Community instrumentalities. Ernst
Haas whose "spill-over" theory of integration enjoyed great
popularity in the heyday of the European unification
movement, has invented a new, equally poetic term to
descrihe the present state of affairs: the Community is, he
writes, in a state of "asymmetric overlap."6
The second caveat relates to the fact that the
Community's powers are confined in principle to the
economic and social sectors; other vital areas remain within
the exclusive competence of the "sovereign" member
states, and therein lies another source of tension inherent in
partial integration. Foreign commercial policy, traditionally
an important tool of national foreign political policy, has
come within Community orbit, yet the foreign political
policy itself remains within the exclusive competence of
national authorities, subject only to voluntary consultation
procedures in a system of committees of national diplomats,
organized outside the Community framework.
The last caveat concerns the role of the Court of Justice
itself. It is next to axiomatic, and the experience in the
United States provides ample supportive evidence, that if a
federal tribunal arrogates to itself judicial power to define
the line between federal and state competences on the basis
of more or less general constitutional allocation , it will

invariably incline toward increasing the reach of the
federation, with a concomitant increment of its own
authority. This, as we have seen, has been happening,
mutatis mutandis, in the Community as well.
The critics of the Court have articulated two related
concerns. First, it has been said that "in less than twenty
years. the constitutionalization of European Community
law has led to the point where, as in the United States, the
supremacy of law seems to mean the supremacy of
judges . .. " with the "specter of substantive due process"
looming over the Community and the "judges using very
vague and general provisions to make policy decisions of
great magnitude according to their own preferences."7 In
fact, the Court did assert its power to apply "principles"
such as "reasonableness" (or "proportionality" or
"equality") in adjudicating the compatibility of Community
regulations with the constitutive treaty, but it has used this
power sparingly; the number of Community legislative acts
struck down as invalid has been minimal and they were of
little long-term importance. It cannot be seriously argued
that the Court has thwarted or challenged the Community
legislator. Of greater impact in this respect were the Court's
rulings hearing upon the validity of member states
legislation and curtailing the competence of the member
states, particularly in the foreign relations field and sex
discrimination in employment. In my judgment, however,
the record is far from one justifying alarm.
A more legitimate concern goes to the current slowdown
in the integration process rather than to the judicial
activism as such. The Court has constructed, as we have
seen, a hold, over-arching doctrine which provides an
effective base for a federal -type structure and is likely to
continue applying it with vigor. On the other hand, the
legislative process of shaping common policies from
divergent national policies has not progressed significantly
beyond the customs-union, common-market state. If
anything, national economic policies in the 1970s have been
drifting even further apart, thus blocking progress toward
an economic unity. It is this contradiction that raises a
legitimate apprehension that the Court may assume an
excessive role in solving questions requiring political
solutions and that it may attempt to carry forward the
process of integration beyond the basic political consensus
on which its legitimacy devends.
If the Community institutions were to be completed in the
federal pattern, common policy decisions would logically
he made in the European Parliament. That body, however,
plays today only an advisory role in Community law making
and the plan for direct elections by universal suffrage
scheduled for June, 1979, does not contemplate a change in
its formal powers. A lively debate has centered on the
question whether the elected Parliament will succeed in
increasing its authority in fact, if not in law.
The European federalism will remain "incipient" and the
integration partial for some time to come, with no certainty
whatsoever as to the ultimate form of transnational
governance in Europe. The French Prime Minister offered
an alternative view of the future in his address at
Strashourg on November 19, 1978:
!Wei want a confederal Europe, by which I mean a
union of states that are associated with one another, but
still preserve their independence, states that consent to
make concessions in their sovereignty in specific areas
and hy carefully defined agreements, as required by the
ties of association. We are not building Europe from
scratch . That is why the united states of Europe cannot be
hased on the same concept as the United States of
America. The building blocks of Europe are old nations
that have their own traditions, history and sensitivities
and also their own interests ....
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Neither federalism nor supranationality, but a patient
march toward confederation.
Another Frenchman, Jean Monnet, who invented the
Community-process idea, wrote in his memoirs:
I have never doubted that one day this process will lead
us to the United States of Europe; but I see no point in
trying to imagine today what political form it will take.
The words about which people argue-federation or
confederation-are inadequate and imprecise. What we
are preparing, through the work of the Community, is
probably without precedent. The Community itself is
founded on institutions, and they need strengthening, but
the true political authority which the democracies of
Europe will one day establish still has to be conceived
and built.
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